Worthy Lives by Rivera, Lisa
University of Massachusetts Boston
ScholarWorks at UMass Boston
Philosophy Faculty Publication Series Philosophy
4-1-2010
Worthy Lives
Lisa Rivera
University of Massachusetts Boston, lisa.rivera@umb.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/philosophy_faculty_pubs
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Philosophy Faculty Publication Series by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more information, please contact
library.uasc@umb.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rivera, Lisa. "Worthy Lives." Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 36, no. 2 (April 2010).
  
© Copyright 2010 by Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 36, No. 2 (April 2010) 
 
1 
UNCORRECTED PROOF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Worthy Lives 
 
Morality places limits on what we can do in pursuit of our goals. In the 
simplest cases, morality limits what we can do in pursuit of our personal 
goals that are not themselves morally valuable. In more complex cases, 
when our personal goals are themselves morally valuable, moral consid-
erations still sometimes take precedence over a moral goal in which we 
are personally invested. But are there cases in which the precedence goes 
the other way—does our investment in a personal goal affect what mo-
rality can require of us? 
 In this paper, I argue that it can. When acting on a reason is necessary 
for meaning, that action can be morally defensible in situations where, in 
the absence of meaning-conferring reasons, the same action would be 
wrong. My central thesis is thus broadly in sympathy with Bernard Wil-
liams and Susan Wolf, who argue that a tension between meaning and 
moral requirements can be resolved in favor of meaning, and that this 
speaks more generally to what we can be morally required to do.1 Here, 
however, I argue that resolutions of the tension in favor of meaning ob-
scure what is at issue if we assume that broad limits on morality’s reach 
automatically follow. Both my specific thesis and the considerations I 
draw on to support it differ from those of both Williams and Wolf, and 
attempt to bring the conflict between meaning and morality into sharper 
focus. 
 In section 1 of this paper I explain and reformulate Williams’s version 
of what I will refer to as the “meaning objection,” and argue that the ob-
jection survives replies to it by utilitarian, Kantian, and hybrid views. In 
section 2 I analyze Wolf’s theory of meaning and her view on its relation 
to morality, and argue that her view of meaning must be revised to carry 
                                                 
 1Bernard Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality,” in Moral Luck (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19; Susan Wolf, “Meaning and Morality,” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1997): 299-315, and “Happiness and Mean-
ing: Two Aspects of the Good Life,” Social Philosophy and Policy 14, no. 1 (1997): 207-
25. Wolf’s paper “Morality and the View from Here,” Journal of Ethics 3 (1999): 203-23 
is less directly related to the question of meaning but develops a position on the moral 
point of view. 
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the weight of the meaning objection. In section 3 I offer a distinction be-
tween finding life worth living and regarding one’s life as worthwhile 
that is necessary to explain the significance to our lives of meaning-
conferring reasons to promote categorical desires. In section 3 I also 
show that with respect to concerns about the demands of impartial moral-
ity, leading a worthy life is more important than finding life worth living. 
Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 The concern that morality and meaning can conflict requires us to 
consider two types of meaningfulness. I take Wolf’s view to be partly 
that we find meaning in enjoying or experiencing what we value, and I 
concede that valuable activities, and how we experience them, can make 
life worth living. However, I argue that the meaning objection depends 
upon the way people structure their lives and their character around 
achieving valuable purposes. The potential conflict with moral consid-
erations arises from the vulnerability of our ability and opportunity to 
successfully realize and contribute value through our actions. Failure to 
realize a purpose of this kind threatens meaning because it threatens the 
worth of our lives.  
 An overall upshot of the paper is that meaning-based moral defensi-
bility can be limited by serious moral considerations; it can also be lim-
ited by meaning itself. A necessary condition for a person’s defense of 
her meaning-conferring reason against certain moral considerations is 
whether the action is necessary to lead a meaningful life. Acting against 
some moral considerations can affect the worth of a person’s life even 
when the action would also allow her to successfully realize a meaning-
conferring goal.  
 
 
1. 
 
The strongest version of the meaning objection would be that a person 
can defensibly pursue a legitimate meaning-conferring reason (that is, a 
reason that actually gives her life meaning) over any moral reason, in-
cluding the moral reasons many views claim she is required to act on. 
Williams’s version of the objection is necessarily narrower than this. His 
version, if it is successful, only shows that meaning-conferring reasons 
are not necessarily overridden by Kantian and utilitarian moral require-
ments. The strongest version of the objection is too strong, in any case. 
What the meaning objection shows, I will argue, is that agents give their 
meaning-conferring reasons much higher priority than their other rea-
sons, and they can sometimes defensibly give meaning-conferring rea-
sons higher priority than reasons to act on moral considerations that 
would otherwise generate moral requirements. If meaning-conferring 
reasons are indeed very strong reasons, this primarily shows that they 
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have substantial relevance for what agents must do morally. It does not 
show that meaning-conferring reasons thereby make morality irrelevant. 
The moral relevance of meaning-conferring reasons may therefore be 
important to questions about what we are actually morally required to do, 
or about which moral reasons are overriding. Resolving these questions 
or considering how the meaning objection fares against every conception 
of moral requirements is not my ambition. In this section, I show that some 
of the main Kantian, utilitarian, and hybrid-theory replies to the meaning 
objection do not adequately account for meaning-conferring reasons. 
 The meaning objection arises partly from Williams’s skepticism that 
the overall impartial moral verdict on a particular situation always results 
in an overriding reason for an agent to perform the action that the verdict 
requires. Although the full extent of Williams’s argument is more com-
plex, the objection is clearly directed at these two features of the impar-
tial theories he is concerned with, Kantian and utilitarian theory.  
 Other arguments from Williams suggest he doubts that an impartial 
moral verdict gives any person a reason to act.2 I set aside questions 
about what constitutes a reason or whether all of an agent’s reasons issue 
from her existing desires, as this is not Williams’s primary concern here 
or the concern of my paper. I will focus on cases in which there is a 
genuine conflict between a reason to promote a particular moral consid-
eration and a reason to promote a personal meaning-conferring consid-
eration, and in which the agent has at least a prima facie reason to attend 
to bona fide moral considerations.3 When a person has a commitment to 
morality and a moral consideration is sufficiently weighty, that consid-
eration must play some role in her deliberation about what to do even 
when it conflicts with meaning-conferring projects.4  
 Although he thinks the objection also applies to utilitarianism, Wil-
liams’s primary target in this particular argument is Kantian theory. He 
objects to the idea he finds in Kantianism that there is “too slim a sense 
in which any projects are mine at all” and also to the view of character 
and the individual that he thinks Kantianism depends on.5 
 Williams argues that we structure our choices and the lives we lead 
                                                 
 2Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” in Moral Luck, pp. 101-14, and 
“Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,” in Making Sense of Humanity (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 35-46. 
 3For simplicity, my central focus is on ground projects without moral content. How-
ever, many meaning-conferring reasons will be for morally valuable projects. 
 4Williams also thinks the objection will arise when someone has a commitment to 
morality. He says, “these [ground] projects, in a normally socialized individual, have in 
good part been formed within, and formed by, dispositions which constitute a commit-
ment to morality. But, on the other hand, the possibility of radical conflict is also there.” 
Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality,” p. 12. 
 5Ibid. 
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around “ground projects” and “commitments.” He claims that some of 
these ground projects play a necessary part in giving us an interest in our 
future. They cannot merely be “set aside” for morality’s sake.6 Desires to 
pursue and realize our ground projects and commitments are categorical 
desires. These desires are unconditional. They do not arise simply be-
cause we continue to live; rather, our reason for going on living is to sat-
isfy them. Our other desires are contingent on whether we choose to live 
and thus depend on our categorical desires. There will be no point to 
those reasons unless we have some reason to live: 
 
The point once more involves the idea that my present projects are a condition of my 
existence in the sense that unless I am propelled forward by a conatus of desire, project 
and interest, it is unclear why I should go on at all.7 
 
 Williams’s claim that our character and identity are bound up with 
categorical desires to realize our projects and to live according to our 
commitments is a view about how we structure our agency. Both identity 
and character are broad concepts, and categorical desires are not relevant 
to everything contained within these concepts. Although Williams does 
not elaborate extensively, his remarks suggest that categorical desires are 
necessary elements in a person’s conception of herself. A person who is 
now a socialist would not have a metaphysically different identity were 
she to become a conservative corporate banker. However, this type of 
transformation is disturbing to imagine because permitting such a change 
would involve failing to be the person she has now chosen to be. Resist-
ing a radical change in her categorical desires, even if the temptations 
come from within, expresses something basic about a person’s agency. 
Character depends in part on how a person organizes her choices, and 
shapes the life that arises out of those choices. We preserve our character 
by giving priority to categorical desires over other choices. Thus, cate-
gorical desires are not just things we happen to want, or even exception-
ally strong desires. They determine (although perhaps not exclusively) 
who we choose to be and how we choose to live.  
 Given what Williams says about reasons to “be around in the world” 
and given that a person’s other reasons are conditional on her reason to 
live, an initial breakdown of his argument could be the following:  
 
(1) If a person S has a reason to ! in the future, she must have a general 
interest in doing things (acting) in the future.  
(2) If S has a general interest in acting in the future, then S has a reason 
to live in the future. 
                                                 
 6Ibid., pp. 12-15. 
 7Ibid., p. 12. 
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(3) If factor X undermines S’s reason to live in the future, then X un-
dermines S’s future reasons to !. 
(4) In some cases, acting on a moral reason undermines S’s reason to 
live in the future. 
(5) In those cases, acting on a moral reason undermines S’s future rea-
sons to !. 
 
Williams concludes that  
 
impartial morality, if the conflict really does arise, must be required to win; and that can-
not necessarily be a reasonable demand on the agent. There can come a point at which it 
is quite unreasonable for a man to give up, in the name of the impartial good ordering of 
the world of moral agents, something which is a condition of his being around in that 
world at all.8  
 
One way to read this conclusion is that it would be unreasonable to re-
quire a person to act on any reason now that would undermine her ability 
to act in the future. This oversimplifies Williams’s argument somewhat 
because it does not address his claims about the role of the reason to live 
in a person’s character and her identity, but it does lay out one basis for 
the objection. Also, situations where the person’s reason to live is en-
tirely undermined will be rare because each person has a set of categori-
cal desires, and other desires from that set may provide a sufficient rea-
son to live. However, people sometimes have a core categorical desire 
such that its loss makes the other categorical desires insufficient to gen-
erate a reason to live. Further, acting against any categorical desire 
amounts to acting against a fundamental aspect of the person one has 
chosen to be.  
 What does Williams mean by his claim that resolving the conflict in 
favor of morality “cannot necessarily be a reasonable demand on the 
agent”? One sense of unreasonable is that what is proposed is contrary to 
reason or objectively irrational. Another sense is that some expectations 
we have of people, or demands we make upon them, are unreasonable 
because they are excessive. An absolute expectation of this kind can be 
excessive without its being irrational or contrary to reason for someone 
to satisfy it. The expectation is excessive because it assumes that the per-
son to whom it is addressed has an overwhelmingly compelling reason to 
satisfy it when she does not. For example, it is unreasonable for you to 
expect or demand of your friend to always pick up the tab, but this does 
not show that it is contrary to reason for your friend to do so. What Wil-
liams appears to mean by “unreasonable” is not that the person will be 
irrational if she chooses to act on the moral reason, but that our expecta-
tion that she will cannot be one that permits no exception. Primarily, this 
                                                 
 8Ibid., p. 14. 
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is because she has a compelling reason not to act on the moral reason 
because it conflicts with her meaning-conferring project.  
 To say that it is unreasonable to demand of S that she act on reason R 
in this case is thus to say that S has a defensible reason not to act on R. It 
is imprecise to conclude that the question raised by the meaning objec-
tion here is whether the person’s reason to promote her categorical desire 
is defensible against any moral requirement. The target of Williams’s 
meaning objection is too narrow to show this: it focuses on certain kinds 
of moral requirements when those requirements directly conflict with 
what is necessary to preserve meaning. Whatever Williams intends by 
the objection, it does not show that a person never has a reason to act on 
any moral requirement whatsoever or that there are never situations 
where moral considerations generate moral requirements that override 
meaning-conferring reasons. The answer to these questions depends too 
much on the way theories construct moral requirements. Rather, the ob-
jection shows that in some cases, a person can legitimately regard her 
categorical desires as constituting reasons that are stronger than the 
moral requirement some moral theories propose, and that some concep-
tions of moral requirements are implausible because they fail to take ac-
count of this. As Williams puts it, “there can come a point” where it is 
too much to ask someone to satisfy the requirement. In those cases, rea-
sons to promote categorical desires (meaning-conferring reasons) are 
defensible and the proposed moral requirement fails to be overriding. 
Therefore, the objection could be read as showing something about what 
moral requirements there are, rather than showing that there are no moral 
requirements or that moral requirements never override meaning-
conferring reasons.  
 The breakdown of Williams’s argument that I offer above suggests 
that there may be fairly serious consequences for an agent who prefers 
morality, and it may be tempting to argue that no moral theory would 
actually require a person to jeopardize her reasons to act in the future in 
order to promote a moral consideration. However, as stated, it is very 
questionable whether it is always defensible to act on one’s categorical 
desire unless we also assume that egoism is true. This is because Wil-
liams provides no account of the content of the categorical desire in 
question or of the seriousness of the moral consideration at issue. Virtu-
ally any view of morality that assumes people should be constrained in 
some way by the interests, values, well-being, and so on of other people 
must deny Williams’s conclusion. Most accounts of morality must deny 
that it is unreasonable to expect anyone, whatever his or her particular 
categorical desire, to be deterred by the effects that satisfying that desire 
will have on others. Williams’s argument, in its bare form, suggests that 
the categorical desires of cult leaders or totalitarian dictators or con art-
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ists are legitimate competitors to any moral consideration, no matter how 
serious. However, the argument, as stated, is not convincing for such 
cases. This also does not seem to be the conclusion Williams is aiming at.  
 Because it is not too much to expect people to avoid pursuing the pro-
ject of a megalomaniac cult leader, it seems fairly clear that moral con-
siderations are also relevant at the point where the person forms an at-
tachment to her project and invests her identity in it such that it comes to 
form her reason to live. If we push the question back to the various 
choices a person makes over time to invest in the projects that structure 
her life, and interpret Williams as making the claim that morality has no 
role to play during this process, his conclusion is implausible. It would 
also make the issue of projects less relevant, because we would have to 
assume morality plays no role before people become invested in a project 
(which clearly does not happen instantaneously). Therefore, a better in-
terpretation of the meaning objection is to assume that it applies to pro-
jects whose pursuit does not require immorality. Given the implausibility 
of claiming that any categorical desire is necessarily a competitor to pur-
ported moral requirements, the meaning objection requires modification; 
a person’s reason to live must not be contrary to morality, as it is under-
stood broadly and, thus far, untheoretically. The person’s project cannot 
be one that by its very nature involves serious immorality.  
 Even when the project is not morally wrong, the objection holds. Pro-
jects that are not contrary to morality, or even projects that are morally 
valuable, can still conflict with the overall moral verdict on an action. 
For example, it would be morally valuable to help the homeless, but it 
might be impermissible to lie to the police to protect a homeless person 
accused of a crime. One way to eliminate the issue would be to require 
that people make adherence to a theory of the right their core categorical 
desire. This would require not just that people make their actions con-
form to morality (which is what moral theories require anyway), but that 
people be so attached to satisfying moral requirements that they want to 
go on being in the world in order to do so. Few people are psychologi-
cally constituted to form such a pure attachment to the satisfaction of 
moral requirements themselves that any significant conflict with other 
things they deem valuable (which may also have moral value) would 
never occur.9 Certain kinds of moral requirements are thought to shape 
how we live our lives, but this will not rule out, ahead of time, the con-
flicts of the type the meaning objection raises so long as we are also liv-
ing our lives for things other than morality. 
                                                 
 9Note that this is not the same as denying that the person must internalize the re-
quirements of the moral theory. A person can do this and still fail to regard the desire to 
abide by the moral theory as constituting a reason to live.  
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 The meaning objection does not apply to every kind of moral theory 
or to every conception of moral reasons where moral considerations gen-
erate a reason that competes with the agent’s projects. For example, the 
meaning objection would not apply to theories where moral reasons do 
not arise from an impartial perspective, such as virtue theory. Some 
moral theories advance no overriding moral requirements and for these, 
the objection may not apply.10 
 If meaning-conferring reasons present extremely strong reasons to 
act, this issue may still be relevant to nonimpartial or nonoverriding 
moral theories to which the objection does not apply directly. On the re-
vised version of the meaning objection that I offer, when agents face 
conflicts between moral considerations and reasons to pursue meaning-
conferring projects, they have reasons to pursue both. Therefore, on vari-
ous nonoverriding or nonimpartial views, the significance of meaning-
conferring projects still raises questions about how to balance the weight 
of moral and meaning-conferring reasons. 
 The meaning objection is supposed to apply to both the impartial and 
the overriding features of Kantian theory and utilitarian theory. Does it 
apply to stronger versions of these theories that have been developed in 
light of Williams’s views about the importance of ground projects? An 
act-consequentialist reply to the meaning objection would be that the 
destruction of meaning is of great cost to an agent, and that this cost has 
moral relevance both because of its own disutility and because it affects 
her ability to produce good consequences in the future. Thus, in terms of 
its consequences for a person’s reason to live, it may be that losing 
meaning has greater overall consequences than the impartial value the 
person could promote by disregarding her reason to live. For example, 
even a highly demanding act-consequentialist theory would rarely require 
someone to lose her legs, because that is a bad consequence. A person’s 
losing meaning has at least as much disutility as losing the use of her legs.  
 However, it is not the case that act-consequentialism never requires 
losing one’s legs (or even one’s life). Thus, we can assume, it would 
sometimes require people to do what would make their lives meaning-
less. More importantly, there is a disanalogy between losing one’s legs 
and losing meaning.  
 One reason that the loss of projects is not like other losses is that ex-
cept in some very peculiar situation, the loss of legs is external to an 
agent’s choices, whereas the loss of projects is internal to her choices. 
                                                 
 10Some egoist theories might conflict with the meaning objection because the objec-
tion takes the view that meaning-conferring reasons are stronger than some self-interested 
reasons that an egoist view may claim a person is rationally required to act upon. (E.g., 
the meaning objection claims that a person can regard certain purposes as worth dying for.) 
The relevance of the meaning objection for egoism is beyond the main scope of the paper. 
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The question that the act-consequentialist must answer is why moral re-
quirements in act-consequentialism do not extend to the agent’s deci-
sions about her attachments and what she has chosen to give her life 
meaning. Act-consequentialism cannot demand that we never decide not 
to lose our legs, because there will be cases in which we have no choice 
about that. But if act-consequentialism extends over all choices, then it 
would seem to require that we either have very weak interests in our pro-
jects, which would interfere with the investment required for meaning, or 
that we simply make act-consequentialism our core and overriding cate-
gorical desire. That these options do not seem very feasible is part of the 
explanation for a waning enthusiasm for act-consequentialism. 
 The meaning objection is also an objection to the idea that considera-
tions like losing one’s legs or losing meaning in life are matters that 
agents are required to consider from an impartial perspective. According 
to act-consequentialism, the relevant moral consideration for the agent is 
that someone loses her legs, and to weigh this against the possible good 
consequences that could be promoted by that loss. Although the agent 
can permissibly care very deeply that it is her legs that will be lost, the 
fact that her own choice leads to the loss of her own legs is not a morally 
relevant consideration. If she is simply considering consequences, and 
her moral reasons are both impartial and overriding, the fact that the legs 
are hers is not relevant to her moral reason. Williams’s objection to this 
conclusion would doubtless be that it cannot be irrelevant to a person’s 
deliberation about what to do that she is the one who loses her legs. The 
situation is worse with respect to meaning-conferring projects, if it is true 
that she structures the activities of her life around her reason to live. How 
can it be that she has an overriding reason to act that is detached from all 
her other reasons to act in virtue of its impartiality, when the basis of her 
interest in acting depends on her interest in her life? Williams suggests, 
perhaps correctly, that it is absurd to suppose that an agent would have to 
regard her own legs—or her meaning-conferring projects—as equivalent 
to anyone’s legs or project.  
 Samuel Scheffler argues for a hybrid view that takes account of issues 
raised above about how to reflect the moral relevance of ground pro-
jects.11 The hybrid view establishes what Scheffler calls an “agent-
centered prerogative” that allows an agent “to devote energy and atten-
tion to his projects and commitments out of proportion to their weight in 
the impersonal calculus.”12 According to Scheffler, one failing of pure 
                                                 
 11The hybrid view specifically attends to Williams’s objection on the grounds of per-
sonal integrity, rather than the meaning objection. See J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Wil-
liams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). 
 12Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1982), p. 15. 
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forms of consequentialism is that they do not allow the personal point of 
view to play a role in determining moral requirements. Unlike act-
utilitarianism, the hybrid view does not require the agent to regard the 
cost of relinquishing meaning in her own life in an impersonal way such 
that the only morally relevant fact is that someone is now leading a 
meaningless life. Instead, she is permitted to give her project greater 
weight on the grounds that it is her project. So the fact that a project (or 
legs) are mine is morally relevant to my choice. Second, the hybrid view 
is less demanding because it leaves room for people to pursue their pro-
jects. So it would not lead to severe demands on a person’s life; it would 
permit her to write her avant-garde novel even though she would produce 
better consequences by spending her time and energy helping at the 
homeless shelter. 
 Scheffler claims it is implausible for any consequentialist theory to 
ignore the personal point of view because “concerns and commitments 
are naturally generated from a person’s point of view quite independently 
of the weight of those concerns in an impersonal ranking of overall states 
of affairs.”13 Granting moral independence to the personal point of view 
is necessary, according to Scheffler, because of  
 
the character of personal agency and motivation: people do not typically view the world 
from the impersonal perspective, nor do their actions typically flow from the kinds of 
concerns a being who actually did inhabit the impersonal standpoint could have.14 
 
 Indirectness is one way that consequentialist theories can leave room 
for the personal point of view, but Scheffler argues that this strategy grants 
insufficient moral independence to the personal point of view. All conse-
quentialist theories determine the right from an impersonal standpoint, 
and so they are all potentially subject to the charge of “alienating the agent 
from his actions and the source of his actions in his own convictions.”15 
 The room that is left for the person to pursue her projects is not 
unlimited: an agent is only allowed to promote his projects over morally 
superior outcomes when  
 
the degree of [his interests’] inferiority to each of the superior outcomes he could instead 
promote in no case exceeded, by more than the specified proportion, the degree of sacri-
fice necessary for him to promote the superior outcome.16 
 
Thus, the “the natural solution” to the claim that morality demands too 
much of agents, “is to allow agents not to promote [optimal] outcomes 
                                                 
 13Ibid., p. 9. 
 14Ibid., p. 62. 
 15Ibid., p. 10. 
 16Ibid., p. 20. 
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when it would be unduly costly or burdensome for them to do so.”17 
 The hybrid view does two critical things: it gives moral independence 
to the personal point of view so that we are not implausibly required to 
regard our own lives impersonally when making moral decisions; and it 
allows us to pursue our projects, but places limits on that pursuit such 
that not absolutely everything we might do to promote them is morally 
defensible. The meaning objection alone does not support the claim that 
any moral consideration whatsoever—for example, killing an innocent 
person—never generates a moral requirement when it conflicts with the 
pursuit of ground projects. Even if reasons arising from categorical de-
sires are exceptionally strong reasons, it has not been shown that they are 
defensible against any moral concern whatsoever.  
 However, Scheffler’s hybrid view does not accurately reflect the per-
sonal point of view as it arises within the meaning objection. Suppose the 
person cannot act on her meaning-conferring reason because the effects 
on her are completely outweighed by a superior outcome, for example, 
she must lose her life’s work in a fire to save all the children in the ele-
mentary school across the street.  
 The hybrid solution, if applied to the meaning objection, ultimately 
considers this in terms of the cost to, or sacrifice of, the person’s good or 
her interests. A loss of meaning is a cost to a person’s good. But that 
construal of acting against a meaning-conferring reason does not reflect 
the agent’s perspective, which is what the personal point of view is 
claimed to reflect. When I act against a categorical desire, the concern 
that act raises for me is not primarily the cost to myself of acting against 
the desire, but instead that I am acting against a reason to which I think it 
essential to give exceptionally high priority. That is, a categorical desire 
creates a reason I believe I must not act against. (The reason might not be 
absolute for every ground project.) In fact, for the agent, the point of the 
reason cannot be evaluated from the standpoint of her good, because she 
may think it necessary to sacrifice her good for the reason. Williams 
thinks ground projects give us reasons to sacrifice our lives. Conse-
quently, I may give up everything else I care about for my ground pro-
ject. And, I could have a reason to suffer horribly to achieve it. So my 
ultimate concern in acting against my reason is not my good, my inter-
ests, or my general ability to carry out a rational plan of life, but the ob-
ject of the reason. Although some might complain that the agent has a 
mistaken all-things-considered view of the matter, that takes us outside 
the personal point of view and pushes Scheffler’s view where he does not 
want it to go, in a direction where the impersonal point of view must de-
termine the shape we give our lives. A categorical concern for the rea-
                                                 
 17Ibid. 
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son’s objective is exactly the personal point of view of the agent, as the 
meaning objection construes it. Acting against her categorical desire vio-
lates her character and identity because of the importance she places on 
the purpose she is pursuing. It is necessary that we give certain purposes 
exceptionally high priority to create the lives we want to live, but they 
are the lives we want to live because of our view on those purposes. The 
effects on identity, character, and reason to live are a result of a person’s 
acting against her reason, not the basis of her reason.  
 Thus, a solution that involves weighing actions in terms of costs to 
the agent or the sacrifice of her interests or the burden on her already 
moves the agent in a consequentialist direction such that it looks as if it 
accommodates the personal point of view to grant that the limit on her 
reason can be defined by the superior outcomes she could instead pro-
mote. But, since the agent’s point of view cannot be represented in terms 
of costs, sacrifices, or burdens, the hybrid view does not accommodate 
what is morally relevant in the agent’s personal point of view, but subtly 
shifts the moral terrain to a more general, impersonal point of view.  
 Even so, the hybrid view addresses a difficult problem that the mean-
ing objection raises, because it puts a limit on what an agent can do to 
satisfy her categorical desire and there probably must be such a limit. 
And the meaning objection may not be a decisive objection in terms of 
what the hybrid view requires of agents, because cases in which the per-
son’s reason is indefensible (e.g., when she has gone much too far in pur-
suing her ground project) could very well coincide with the cases in 
which Scheffler’s theory puts a limit on her.18 The hybrid view might 
therefore never demand that anyone act against her categorical desire in a 
situation where she could defend doing so. But the meaning objection 
raises a more general question about the aspect of the personal point of 
view that concerns an agent’s conception of her reasons. In light of its 
concern to accommodate the personal point of view, the hybrid view 
does not give the right answer to this question.  
 On the Kantian view, the significance we ascribe to our own purpose 
in life is an incomplete justification for acting on that purpose. Kantian 
restrictions limit the ways we can use others to achieve our purposes, 
whatever value we may happen to think they have. Thus, it is usually 
assumed that Kantian theory would not allow someone to lead a life that 
                                                 
 18It is difficult to tell whether this is true, because it is not entirely clear what the 
hybrid view permits or forbids. For example, Scheffler rejects agent-centered restrictions. 
But if I am weighing the cost of a meaningless life in which I have no reason to live as a 
harm to me against the cost of a lesser harm I do to another person (e.g., suppose I intend 
to swindle a rich person out of money he does not need), does the hybrid view permit me 
to harm that person? This may in fact be plausible, but, by leaving out agent-centered 
restrictions, the hybrid view could be more permissive than it initially appears. 
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involves complete deceit in the service of a just cause—for example, if 
overthrowing an unjust regime requires working as a secret agent among 
the oligarchy so that the agent can feed information to her revolutionary 
cadre.19 There is some controversy over what the various formulations of 
the categorical imperative (CI) permit and how the Formula of Humanity 
should be interpreted. In general though, the Formula of Humanity for-
bids us from using others as mere means, and this constrains the priority 
we can give to any kind of meaning-conferring reason. Although the 
principle may not be absolute in evil circumstances, in general, permit-
ting the weighing of good aims against the treatment of a person as a 
mere means would distort a fundamental feature of Kant’s view that hu-
manity is of absolute value. Nonmoral meaning-conferring reasons will 
be impermissible when acting on them conflicts with perfect duties.  
 According to some interpretations of what the CI requires, certain 
types of actions that ordinarily violate the principle do not do so in cer-
tain circumstances. On one reading of the Formula of Humanity, we 
might be permitted to commit suicide or otherwise sacrifice our lives, lie, 
break promises, or act in a servile fashion when faced with a particular 
moral evil.20 However, we treat humanity as a means if we do so to ac-
complish a purpose that has only price (conditional value). Our contin-
gent goals, including our meaning-conferring projects, are such purposes. 
Thomas Hill states:  
 
Pleasure and pain and the particular goals one has because of what one desires to achieve, 
are thought to have only conditional value, or price, and so suicide or the killing of others 
for the sake of increasing pleasure, diminishing pain, or achieving any contingently de-
sired goal is wrong.21 
 
 One reason some doubt that the meaning objection is a significant 
issue for Kantian theory is that Kantian theory is thought not to be de-
manding in a way that makes the objection stick. Barbara Herman offers 
two significant replies to the meaning objection. First, she argues that on 
the Kantian picture, morality is not something that comes from the out-
side to intervene in a person’s choices, but that morality is something to 
which the person is committed unconditionally: “It is a defining feature 
of Kantian morality that one basic attachment, one self-defining project, 
                                                 
 19“According to the Formula of Humanity, coercion and deception are the most fun-
damental forms of wrongdoing to others—the roots of all evil. Coercion and deception 
violate the conditions of possible assent, and all actions which depend for their nature and 
efficacy on their coercive or deceptive character are ones that others cannot assent to.” 
Christine Korsgaard, “The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil,” in Creating the 
Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 133-58, at p. 140. 
 20Korsgaard, “The Right to Lie.” 
 21Thomas E. Hill, Jr., “Humanity as an End in Itself,” in Dignity and Practical Rea-
son (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 52. 
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is morality itself.”22 Herman argues that such a project may confer mean-
ing on a person’s life and constitute her reason to live such that “living a 
moral life can be partially constitutive of character.”23 According to 
Herman, Kantian morality is the only unconditional project a person can 
permissibly have. 
 Second, Herman argues that Kantian moral requirements are not so 
demanding that all of a person’s reasons are required to be impartially 
justified. Instead, Kantian morality offers “a regulative ideal … Those 
actions that are judged permissible are not distanced from the agent’s 
primary interest in them by that fact.”24 Kantian morality is a “limiting 
condition” that does not dictate the content of all permissible reasons to 
act, but instead determines which reasons are permissible. Although im-
perfect duties, such as the duty of beneficence, do require us to act be-
neficently, Herman argues that the agent herself has significant latitude 
in deciding when and how to satisfy this duty. This is thought to leave 
the right amount of room for us to act on any meaning-conferring reason 
that is morally defensible.  
 Herman’s view is that it is implausible to claim that meaning-
conferring pursuits are unconditional such that ignoring moral considera-
tions for them is always defensible. She is correct both for the content of 
our projects and the way we pursue them. There is no compelling de-
fense of the categorical desire to be a megalomaniac dictator in the face 
of reasons not to deprive others of their freedom. And, perhaps, it may 
not be defensible for me to fund the homeless shelter through fraud and 
theft as I can seek other ways to acquire these funds. It is also true that 
Kantian theory is not as demanding as act-consequentialist theory, be-
cause its reach does not extend over all projects.  
 A central question that the meaning objection raises is whether   
meaning-conferring projects carry significant weight in the face of con-
siderations that generate moral requirements in the absence of such rea-
sons. If a person derives meaning from something other than her desire 
to conform to Kantian morality, then preserving meaning may require 
her to negotiate with less serious moral requirements if she wants to 
carry out her meaning-conferring project. Is there any reason to suppose 
that some cases of treating a person as a mere means are less serious than 
others? One explanation for a distinction people often make between 
permissible and impermissible acts of this type is the level of harm that 
will be done to others. On this commonsense view, it is possible to treat 
ourselves and others as mere means without doing lasting (or, for certain 
                                                 
 22Barbara Herman, “Integrity and Impartiality,” in The Practice of Moral Judgment 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 23-44, at p. 38. 
 23Ibid. 
 24Ibid., p. 39. 
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kinds of successful lies, apparent) damage to ourselves and others.  
 Suppose that Alice writes a novel that revolves around a fictional rep-
resentation of a secret her cousin Suzanne made her promise never to 
reveal. Suzanne is upset and forbids Alice from publishing the novel. 
Alice publishes it anyway. She is not unconcerned about Suzanne’s feel-
ings; however, she spent many years on this novel, this is the story she 
had to tell, and any chance she has of leading a life as a writer depends 
on her publishing soon. Suppose Alice is correct that Suzanne will not be 
harmed by the publication. For example, Alice correctly believes that 
Suzanne’s fears of public shaming are unfounded and that Suzanne is the 
type of person who gets very upset about certain things but recovers 
fairly quickly. 
 Alice uses Suzanne as a mere means and is also “taking attitudes to-
ward [Suzanne] which involve regarding her as not in control of herself, 
which is to say, as not using her reason.”25 In other words, she regards a 
Kantian moral prohibition as less serious than her contingent purposes, 
and decides in favor of her meaning-conferring purposes. To do this does 
not require her to entirely disregard moral considerations. Instead, she 
weighs the seriousness of a set of moral considerations against a loss of 
meaning if she ends up as a lawyer, or a schoolteacher, rather than a nov-
elist. If Suzanne’s life is ruined, then this may be another story. But tak-
ing the relevance of this into account again requires that we balance 
moral considerations against a person’s meaning-conferring reason that 
does not make sense within Kantian theory, because a meaning-
conferring reason is, morally speaking, simply one of a person’s contin-
gent ends. With respect to its moral relevance against Kantian moral re-
quirements, there is nothing special about a meaning-conferring reason 
when compared to any other contingent reasons. This may be the basis of 
Williams’s complaint that Kantian theory does not take character and 
identity seriously. Although this complaint is overdrawn, it is true that 
with respect to the view we should have of our reasons, Kantian theory 
does not take into account the disruption to character and identity that is 
involved in acting against one’s meaning-conferring projects or the 
moral relevance of this for agents. If Kantian morality requires a person 
to regard Kantian morality as her only unconditional project, it seems 
that the agent should also take this view on her reasons.  
 Herman intimates that the real issue only arises for serious moral re-
quirements:  
 
The moral agent knows in advance that neither his identification of himself with a project 
nor the (true) fact that if he is unable to act as he wants his life will be emptied of mean-
ing for him is sufficient to justify his acting against (serious) moral requirements. Indeed, 
                                                 
 25Korsgaard, “The Right to Lie,” p. 141. 
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given the possibility of grossly immoral projects or vile actions taken for the sake of 
morally neutral projects, it does not seem rational to want it otherwise.26 
 
If we assume, as Herman suggests, that a person is permitted to negotiate 
between meaning-conferring pursuits and less serious moral considera-
tions, does Kantian morality allow us to balance meaning-conferring pur-
suits against Kantian moral requirements? Some meaning-conferring 
pursuits have moral relevance in the sense that they affect the overall 
moral verdict on a particular situation. For example, the importance of 
meaning to a person does seem to affect whether a consideration such as 
treating a person as a mere means in a way that does him no serious harm 
actually generates an overriding moral requirement. The strength of Al-
ice’s meaning-conferring reason will be quite different from the strength 
of another reason she may have. It would not be defensible for her to 
break her promise and tell Suzanne’s story simply to impress a person 
she admires. However, the agent’s perspective that her meaning-
conferring reason carries a weight that affects whether treating someone 
as a means is serious enough to require her to act on that consideration is 
entirely illegitimate on the Kantian view. If we take up Herman’s sugges-
tion that Kantian morality must be a moral person’s unconditional pro-
ject, and she is required to expect that she is always unjustified in any 
attempt to balance considerations that (on Kantian theory) always gener-
ate requirements and meaning-conferring considerations, then we better 
understand Williams’s claim that morality has a very extensive reach 
over the person’s life, her self, and her character, on the Kantian view.  
 This argument does not show that there is no defense of Kantian 
moral requirements against these claims. It only shows that the meaning 
objection is still a live objection in two ways. First, the fact that Kantian 
requirements are limiting conditions does not show that Kantian re-
quirements are undemanding in terms of what they mean for a person’s 
life and her character. Second, since the Kantian conception of what a 
moral person is does not exhaust all options of what it means to be a 
moral person, Herman’s reply to Williams has not shown that a person 
who acts on her meaning-conferring reason against a Kantian require-
ment has also failed to satisfy every plausible moral defense of the prior-
ity she gives to her meaning-conferring reason. 
 Williams’s claims are broad enough to warrant Herman’s concern 
about grossly immoral projects and vile actions. But the meaning objec-
tion can also be modified to accommodate this concern by assuming, as 
Williams tacitly seems to, that the person in question is not an egoist or 
amoral and refrained from structuring her life around the type of project 
that by its nature requires immorality to pursue. The problem the mean-
                                                 
 26Herman, “Integrity and Impartiality,” p. 39. 
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ing objection raises still occurs for people who are committed to being 
morally decent and who have a categorical desire to lead a moral life (if 
this desire, so far, is left open to other, non-Kantian, views of what that 
amounts to). If Herman’s earlier claim that the commitment to comply 
with Kantian moral requirements is an unconditional commitment, how-
ever, there is not sufficient warrant to suppose that an agent’s meaning-
conferring projects will only conflict with serious moral requirements. In 
fact, there is nothing that permits the agent to negotiate with morality 
here, in defense of his contingent meaning-conferring commitments, 
when pursuit of the project conflicts with a perfect duty or requires ig-
noring imperfect duties to an extent that is impermissible. 
 It makes sense to suppose, as Herman seems to, that there is some 
morally respectable path to determining when a moral consideration is 
not sufficiently strong to outweigh a meaning-conferring commitment. In 
Kantian theory there is no such path for actions that violate the categori-
cal imperative in any way. If meaning is not morally relevant to the over-
all moral verdict, then a person cannot regard her meaning-conferring 
pursuits as having a stronger weight than an unserious moral requirement 
even if she could act in a non-vile way. It is not clear where Kantian the-
ory leaves room for a negotiation between an action necessary to con-
tinue with, or pursue, or achieve, a meaning-conferring goal and trivial 
violations of the categorical imperative. Any conflict a moral agent 
would have about such matters seems to be a result of her inability to 
understand what her reasons really are. However, it is arguable that even 
people who regard living a moral life as partially constitutive of their 
character could have a meaning-conferring reason to engage in negotia-
tion with the type of moral considerations that generate moral require-
ments when various less serious reasons are at stake. And it is possible 
that doing so may be morally defensible. 
 
 
2. 
 
Susan Wolf offers a view of the relationship between our reason to live 
and those activities, relationships, interests, projects, and experiences that 
give our lives meaning that is not explained in Williams’s view.27 First, 
Wolf claims that it is the importance of meaning to our lives that gives 
Williams’s meaning objection its force. One problem with losing mean-
                                                 
 27It is clear that given Wolf’s view that objective value is a necessary condition for 
meaningfulness, meaning and the reason to live cannot be coextensive. For example, my 
reason to live might be to wreak vengeance on the person who destroyed my father’s 
farm (as in the film Manon of the Spring), but, if Wolf is correct about objective value, 
this reason does not make my life meaningful.  
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ing may be a loss of happiness, but meaning is valuable independently of 
its importance to personal happiness.28 Wolf agrees with Williams that a 
reason to live is a condition of an interest in one’s life, but she adds that 
being able to pursue meaning in the form of one’s reason to live “is an 
important element of a good life.”29 
 Second, Wolf claims that what a person finds meaningful is often 
subject to a limited choice. Many different kinds of valuable activities—
art, travel, philanthropic work, political activism, civic engagement—
might give our lives meaning. However, we cannot simply choose to find 
one of these things meaningful, as we may not have a subjective attrac-
tion to it. We cannot necessarily find an objectively valuable pursuit 
meaningful by an act of will.30 
 The third fact about meaning is critical to Wolf’s argument, although 
she does not think that Williams would necessarily endorse it: meaning 
depends on a relationship between our activities and that which is objec-
tively valuable. Although our lives are made meaningful by our attach-
ments and interests, Wolf argues that not every desired object or activity 
lends meaning to a life. We can recognize the difference between, for 
example, the meaninglessness of watching TV or doing crossword puz-
zles, and the meaningfulness of engaging in loving relationships or “a 
life dedicated to music.”31 The difference, Wolf claims, lies in our belief 
that the latter is objectively valuable while the former is not: 
 
Meaningfulness in life, in other words, arises out of people responding to things that are 
and that they see to be worth responding to. One’s life is meaningful in proportion to the 
degree to which one can see oneself as bound up with things, people, activities or projects 
of worth in a deep and positive way.32 
 
To find our lives meaningful, we must believe that our involvements 
have objective worth. However, we may be wrong about this, according 
to Wolf. Thus, it is possible that some of the involvements we think are 
meaningful actually are so (when they are bound up with things of objec-
tive value) and some might not be (when what we believe is valuable 
turns out not to be).  
 Wolf’s claim here requires some defense. If the issue raised by the 
meaning objection is whether a person is motivationally rooted or cares 
about anything, her belief that her attachments have value should be suf-
                                                 
 28Wolf, “Meaning and Morality,” p. 303. 
 29Wolf, “Happiness and Meaning,” p. 207. 
 30The converse does not seem true, however. Presumably, we could prevent ourselves 
from pursuing immoral projects in order to avoid the (subjective, and on Wolf’s view, 
illegitimate) sense of meaning they might provide. 
 31Wolf, “Meaning and Morality,” p. 304.  
 32Ibid.  
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ficient. People can believe that worthless or even immoral pursuits are 
objectively valuable, or they can fail to reflect on what they value and 
choose valueless projects. A hit man could regard his service to the mafia 
boss as valuable and gain a sense that his life is meaningful, frequently 
revisiting with pride his skill at assassination. Wolf does not think that 
our lives must have ultimate meaning, from the point of view of the uni-
verse, to be meaningful. Why must our aims be objectively valuable?  
 In defense of Wolf’s claim, it seems a reasonable assumption that 
meaningfulness requires some secure grounding in the facts about one’s 
life. That is, there may be a counterfactual condition on meaningfulness. 
For a person’s life to be actually meaningful, she must be able to retain 
her subjective sense of meaning were she to know the relevant facts 
about her projects, including their value. While our sense of meaningful-
ness depends upon what we believe about our lives, we can suppose that 
for our lives to be actually meaningful, what we believe about them must 
be roughly true.  
 Wolf’s argument relies on a plausible assumption about the tie be-
tween our subjective sense of meaning and our beliefs about the value of 
what we do. If I believe both that X matters to me and that X does not 
objectively matter (that is, if I believe my interest in X is a mere idiosyn-
crasy since X isn’t actually valuable), then it is unlikely that X will make 
my life meaningful to me. I may enjoy X, and this enjoyment may make 
my life more pleasant, but it doesn’t make my life meaningful, even to 
me. Thus Wolf’s claim about objective meaning requires that one’s be-
lief in the objective value of the thing one is pursuing must be true, to a 
large extent. Some people may find fulfillment in valueless pursuits such 
as counting blades of grass but, Wolf argues, although fulfillment is as-
sociated with meaning, it is insufficient for it. She defends this claim, in 
part, by arguing that our fulfillment is usually dependent on our belief 
that it is caused by what is actually valuable. Discovering that the cause 
of our fulfillment is not valuable makes the fulfillment irrelevant to 
meaning. When a woman discovers that she was being used, rather than 
loved, in a romantic relationship, her prior fulfillment does not make the 
relationship meaningful in retrospect.33 
 Wolf offers a slogan to explain meaning: it “arises in a person’s life 
when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness.”34 The contri-
bution a thing makes to meaning in our lives is dependent not only on its 
value but also on our attraction to it. Meaning, when understood as a 
form of response to things of objective value, is partly involuntary. And 
meaningfulness is vulnerable to disruption because, although there may 
                                                 
 33Wolf, “Happiness and Meaning,” pp. 216-19. 
 34Wolf, “Meaning and Morality,” p. 305. 
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be a wide variety of objectively valuable pursuits, we will not be at-
tracted to all those pursuits. 
 Wolf claims that a wide variety of pursuits, activities, and experiences 
will be meaning-conferring: 
 
One can get meaning from creating, promoting, protecting (worthwhile) things, from 
helping people one loves and people in need, from achieving levels of skill and excel-
lence, from overcoming obstacles, from gaining understanding, and even from just com-
muning with or actively appreciating what is there to be appreciated.35 
 
What gives life meaning, according to Wolf, are less the particular “well-
defined and goal-oriented tasks” than the “larger involvements” that are 
made up of these tasks.36 What she seems to mean by this is that the lar-
ger involvements are the point of these smaller tasks. If a person’s life is 
to be meaningful, she must be engaged in what she does, and the larger 
involvements in the overall pattern of her life must be worthwhile. The 
second criterion, that of attachment, depends not only on our belief that 
what we do matters, but also on how we experience what we do. Mean-
ing “consists in active engagement in projects and activities of worth.”37 
If a person is involved in an objectively valuable activity but finds her 
life meaningless because she is not deeply engaged, she is lacking in a 
categorical desire that gives her a reason to live.  
 Conversely, a person might be actively engaged by things that are 
objectively worthless, either because they are trivial (e.g., “memorizing 
the dictionary”) or because they are of questionable value:  
 
Controversial cases will include the corporate lawyer who sacrifices her private life and 
health for success along the professional ladder, the devotee of a religious cult, or … the 
pig farmer who buys more land to grow more corn to feed more pigs to buy more land to 
grow more corn to feed more pigs.38  
 
This suggests an omission in Wolf’s argument, however. To explain why 
building a pig empire and sacrificing personal choices for corporate law 
are questionable as sources of meaning, we must consider more than the 
absence of objective value. There is (potentially) some objective value in 
these projects. Even the religious cultist might experience moments of 
religious transcendence or a meaningful sense of community with other 
cultists. Setting aside the issue of the ethical treatment of animals, the pig 
farmer is providing food to others (although his focus may lie primarily 
in expanding his pig empire). We see more clearly why it is questionable 
that such projects could provide meaning by considering (1) whether 
                                                 
 35Wolf, “Happiness and Meaning,” p. 212. 
 36Ibid. 
 37Ibid., p. 213.  
 38Ibid., p. 211.  
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they are projects of significant value, and (2) whether the person’s en-
gagement connects to her overall view about the role the projects have in 
shaping her life. That is, even if a person experiences objective value to 
which she is subjectively attached, this may be insufficient to create 
meaning. This would suggest that it is not just subjective attachment to 
objective value that creates meaning, but the significance of the valued 
pursuits and the person’s view that the pursuit would make her life mean-
ingful. 
 Therefore, the significance of what we pursue seems to be an addi-
tional condition for projects to be meaningful. Quite a few things we do 
engage with objective value in a (sometimes minuscule) way. Many triv-
ial activities, such as enjoying an art reproduction on the back of a post-
card or stocking the birdfeeder through the winter, engage with some 
objective value. Video games can have aesthetic value and demand lev-
els of skill that are arguably comparable to athletic activities or playing 
chess, in terms of the value they add to someone’s life. Williams empha-
sizes that reasons to live play a central role in our identity and character. 
Many activities that we are attracted to, particularly activities of appre-
ciation and enjoyment of value, are insufficient to pull us forward into 
the future or form the basis of identity and character.  
 
 
3. 
 
On Wolf’s view, various objectively valuable activities that engage and 
enliven us give our lives meaning. Although it is a controversial aspect 
of her argument, I will not challenge Wolf’s pluralist view about value or 
her claim that the value must be objective.39 The question I raise is whether 
this picture of an engaged active person, one who is doing what she has 
reason to value, captures the conflict between meaning-conferring reasons 
and moral reasons that the meaning objection raises.  
 One question about Wolf’s view of meaning as it applies to this issue 
has already been mentioned: many activities that are sufficiently similar 
to the activities Wolf regards as objectively valuable and meaning-
conferring—for example, watching ballet, or an interest in chess—are 
insignificant or trivial and primarily sought after as enjoyable personal 
experiences.40 This is not to say they are not worth doing. Rather, many 
                                                 
 39Wolf does not intend to defend her idea of what is objectively valuable with a theory 
of worth. She grounds her view primarily in beliefs people have about their own and 
others’ pursuits. Cf. “Happiness and Meaning,” pp. 212-13. It is not clear that she needs a 
view of objective value for the argument to work, however. What seems necessary for her 
argument is primarily the claim that some things are valuable and others are not and this 
is true independently of whatever view the person doing the valuing has on the matter.  
 40Ibid., p. 212. 
22 Lisa Rivera 
 
 
 
activities we are attracted to that engage with objective value are not 
likely candidates for a reason to live. This is because, although we can be 
strongly attached to them, they are insufficient to give us an interest in 
the future. A good reason for pursuing such activities is that they en-
hance our lives. Their value is not independent of our existence and they 
would not give us a reason to go on if we otherwise saw no point to that. 
 The meaning objection suggests three main problems with the expec-
tation that we must always act on certain kinds of moral requirements. 
First, acting on certain moral requirements can require us to act against a 
reason that grounds our interest in our future. Second, when we act 
against our reason to live, we may act against an organizing element in 
our character, that is, a categorical desire we believe we must (fre-
quently, if not always) give normative priority to when it competes with 
other things we could do. Finally, our conception of ourselves is bound 
up in categorical desires. They determine, perhaps not wholly, the kind 
of person we decide to be. If a desire to pursue something constitutes a 
categorical desire and hence a person’s reason to live, that desire is cen-
tral to her life and agency. Many of our valued activities—and even the 
larger valuable involvements of which they are a part, as Wolf puts it—
do not have this kind of centrality.  
 However, Wolf’s view is that a life engaged in worthwhile activity is 
not irrelevant to meaning. Rather, two kinds of meaning matter to us. 
Meaning as contribution depends on pursuits that make our lives worthy 
or estimable to us because, if successful, we will achieve a valuable pur-
pose with our lives. When we seek a purpose for our lives, we look to 
contribute something of value and significance to the world. Meaning as 
engagement makes life worth living when we regularly experience or 
appreciate what is valuable.  
 Questions about meaning and meaningfulness in life break down into 
a number of related, but conceptually separable, questions. Thus, ques-
tions about the meaning of life can be: Does life have an ultimate pur-
pose? Is our life significant in some way over and above our interest in 
it? Is life worth living? Is our life itself worthwhile? The latter two ques-
tions, because they concern how we structure our lives, are relevant to 
the issue here. They are also the questions we are most likely to ask our-
selves. 
 Meaning as engagement depends on whether a person’s life is worth 
living. Life is more worth living if we are able to appreciate, engage 
with, and experience that which is valuable. The experience of living is 
enriched when we listen to music, travel to interesting places, or revel in 
nature. I take the term “engagement” from Wolf. She claims that  
 
[a] person is actively engaged by something if she is gripped, excited, involved by it. 
Most obviously, we are actively engaged by the things and people about which and 
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whom we are passionate ... To be actively engaged in something is not always pleasant ... 
(consider, for example: writing a book, climbing a mountain, training for a marathon, 
caring for an ailing friend). However, there is something good about the feeling of en-
gagement: one feels (typically without thinking about it) especially alive.41 
 
 Meaning as contribution depends on activities that reflect our agency, 
closely shape our deliberative choices and satisfy our desire to be effec-
tive actors in the world. Realizing certain purposes can make our life 
worthwhile. Purposive reasons provide the meaningfulness of contribut-
ing to or creating value in the world through our actions. For these to 
play a central role in shaping our lives and character, we must regard 
what they are for as significant. Our desire to lead a worthy life shapes 
many of the projects we choose, including moral projects. This explains 
why the failure of a central project threatens a life’s meaningfulness. We 
might value the courage or perseverance we show in pursuing our life’s 
purpose, but we ultimately want something to result from our efforts. 
Our evaluation on the worth of our lives, both retrospective and prospec-
tive, can depends on our project’s success.  
 People often seek both kinds of meaning. We can find life worth liv-
ing because we value activities that enliven our existence. Further, we 
value living because of our desire to do something worthwhile with our 
lives. Both of these are vulnerable to alterations in our capacity to pursue 
what we value. If playing the piano is a hobby that enriches my life, then 
anything that permanently interferes with my ability to play the piano 
(e.g., arthritis) would be a blow that could make my life less worth living 
to me. One reason that severe illness or disability has the potential to 
make life less meaningful is that these curtail our ability to commune 
with or actively appreciate “what there is to be appreciated” or achieve 
“levels of skill and excellence.”42 Our ability to be fully engaged in ac-
tivities that make life worth living is vulnerable to circumstance because 
such experiences can depend on sufficient wealth, opportunity, and men-
tal or physical health.  
 However, meaning as engagement is much less vulnerable to disrup-
tion by acting on moral reasons rather than meaning-conferring reasons. 
The pursuits that ground meaning as engagement most plausibly conflict 
only with very demanding and pervasive versions of morality, for exam-
ple, versions of act-consequentialism, whose scope extends to most of 
our actions. Our ability to have experiences of the type Wolf regards as 
meaning-conferring, such as appreciation of the arts, requires time and 
resources. On some act-utilitarian views, there may be an overriding rea-
son to use some of these resources to decrease suffering or promote other 
                                                 
 41Ibid., p. 209. 
 42Ibid., p. 212. 
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good consequences. Less pervasive forms of consequentialism, such as 
indirect consequentialism or rule-consequentialism usually leave suffi-
cient room for people to pursue many projects of this kind.  
 Reasons that promote meaning as engagement are not persuasive 
competitors to the limiting conditions that Kantian requirements place on 
action. Satisfying Kantian moral requirements may interfere with par-
ticular instances where I might have more of this kind of meaning of my 
life. I might not be able to afford tickets to the opera unless I steal or bor-
row money I cannot repay. We can also imagine highly specific projects 
of engagement that conflict with moral requirements. For example, my 
aesthetic appreciation of indigenous art may tempt me to acquire rare 
archeological artifacts when doing so conflicts with the patrimony rights 
of other cultures and is against their consent. However, I do not have an 
especially strong meaning-based reason to prefer my projects of en-
gagement in specific instances when this interest conflicts with important 
moral considerations, like others’ rights. It may add meaning to my life 
to ignore morality in these instances, but this is not necessary for me to 
retain meaning in my life, as long as I have other opportunities to experi-
ence similar kinds of activities. Thus, my reason to pursue this kind of 
meaning is not especially defensible here against a putative moral re-
quirement. 
 Likewise, my identity and character are not significantly threatened if 
I promote a moral consideration over my projects of engagement in a 
specific instance. Less pervasive views, such as Kant’s view, will only 
constrain me in very limited ways. Projects of engagement do have some 
relevance to our understanding of our identity and our character. If they 
are connected to our aesthetic outlook on the world, for example, they 
can affect important life choices (e.g., about where we live or whom we 
marry). But in situations where they conflict with other things we have a 
reason to do, we do not threaten our reason to live or our character if we 
assign them a fairly low normative priority. This is not similarly true of 
reasons to act on categorical desires whose purpose is to contribute 
value. If a person is unable to be a novelist or fight for the revolution, or 
if she utterly fails at these pursuits, important aspects of her character 
and her self-concept will fundamentally change. But even an ardent 
cinephile or classical music lover could accept alteration in these projects 
without regarding them as a betrayal of what her life is about. 
 Successfully promoting our categorical desires for valuable aims is 
meaningful because it gives worth to our lives. Whether our life is mean-
ingful in terms of the contribution we intend to make does not primarily 
depend on our being enlivened by pursuing the project, although we may 
be. Meaning depends instead on the project’s successful realization and 
our contribution to that. The relevant sense of meaning here arises from 
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how we utilize our agency and the evaluation that our life will amount to 
something worthwhile. The main issue, with respect to morality, is that 
acting on certain kinds of overriding moral requirements could make it 
impossible to realize these projects. This will be true for both pervasive 
and demanding conceptions of impartial requirements, like act-
utilitarianism, and for views where morality is a limiting condition on 
action, such as Kantian theory.  
 Meaning as contribution is more vulnerable than meaning as engage-
ment to competition from moral considerations. Forgoing opportunities 
to promote projects where we create or contribute something of value to 
the world can cause us to fail at our purpose. These projects are not eas-
ily replaced by other meaningful projects. This is not just because our 
attraction to projects cannot be willed, but also because our contingent 
inclinations, abilities, and limited time and opportunity limit our chances 
to do something worthwhile with our lives. Acting on competing reasons 
can make it impossible for us to go on with that project and to achieve 
what our categorical desire requires. As Williams points out, certain 
categorical desires are exceedingly difficult to act against without also 
failing to live the life one has chosen. If I fail to protect my child, my 
nation, my honor, or my work, I may betray what I believe my life is 
about. The inability to realize a project can leave a person with nothing 
to live for. A moral requirement that forbids me from lying to fake a dis-
ability may also prevent me from finishing my novel. Scientific work or 
similarly all-consuming projects may require a life that excludes benefi-
cence for a morally unacceptable length of time. Unless I leave the in-
jured person by the roadside, I will not make my crucial audition. Suc-
cess at getting a rich and arrogant person to support my documentary 
may require a morally unacceptable amount of servility, flattery, and de-
ceit. If my failure to make the documentary means that I have to move in 
with my sister and become a waitress, the life that results from acting on 
moral reasons may not be the life I have chosen to lead. Nor will it nec-
essarily be a life I desire to lead.  
 The strength of a meaning-conferring reason for an agent does not 
depend entirely on the costs to her happiness, her psychology, or her 
other interests if she fails to satisfy it. A person’s intention to live the life 
she has chosen for herself is one of her interests, but it is also more fun-
damental than self-interest. Categorical desires will structure the priority 
she gives even to other self-interested reasons. Further, the weight the 
agent believes it is necessary to give to her reason to choose the person 
she is and lead the life she intends depends on the reason’s status as cate-
gorical, and this is not fully explicable in terms of self-interest. Williams 
claims, for example, that if death is necessary for our ground project, 
26 Lisa Rivera 
 
 
 
then we have a reason to die for it.43 Such reasons are necessarily 
stronger than those we have for other things that would benefit us, such 
as a desire to be rich or better-looking. To lead a life that is consistent 
with her character and identity requires a person to weigh these reasons 
very heavily against competing considerations—for example, against 
things that might benefit her in other ways or that she desperately wants.  
 However, there are still issues with how defensible these reasons are 
when weighed against competing moral considerations. These reasons 
surely do not defeat moral restrictions on people’s desire to take the 
quickest and easiest path to successfully achieving their meaning-
conferring projects when doing so requires immorality. There are also 
cases in which people conceive of their projects as deeply valuable, even 
morally valuable—for example, defending the nation—and that concep-
tion seems to distort what it is actually defensible for them to do. Rea-
sons to promote justice or loyalty to country often cause people to be 
disturbingly favorable to their own goals against very strong moral con-
siderations, like not killing innocent people. One thing that rules out 
many of these actions is the very clear limit on the defensibility of pursu-
ing meaning-conferring reasons: whether the success of my project actu-
ally depends on rejecting these moral considerations. In many cases, it 
probably does not. Yet, if there is already a moral burden on an agent to 
consider alternative actions when the success of her projects is not at 
stake, this indicates that moral considerations could generate require-
ments that override meaning-conferring reasons when meaning is not 
threatened.  
 More importantly, it is questionable whether meaning-conferring rea-
sons ever outweigh reasons to respect serious moral considerations, such 
as the prohibition against severely harming others. If it is not plausible to 
assume that they do, this does not mean that the issue Williams’s argu-
ment raises can be ignored by theories where moral requirements are 
overriding. There remains the question of how we structure moral re-
quirements to accommodate these reasons within a conception of moral 
requirements. This is a difficult question that I cannot answer here. 
 However, meaning itself limits what a person can do in the pursuit of 
her projects. Our concern to lead a worthwhile life can be defeated by 
ignoring certain moral considerations. Our estimation of the worth of our 
life is potentially affected by everything we have done, or failed to do, 
with our lives. Thus, more than the success of our projects is relevant to 
whether our life is meaningful. If worth is a measure of meaning, then 
serious acts of immorality affect whether our lives turn out to be mean-
ingful. I have argued that the meaning objection is not plausible when it 
                                                 
 43Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality,” p. 13. 
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is so widely construed that it includes people who do not take moral con-
siderations as reason-giving at all. The relevant person for the meaning 
objection is someone who gives morality a role in the projects she 
chooses to structure her life around. As Williams puts it, we are consider-
ing a normally socialized individual. A person like this will be unable to 
avoid giving considerable weight to serious moral considerations. For 
example, certain moral constraints are very difficult to ignore for anyone 
reliably responsive to moral considerations; she will not feel free to mur-
der or torture others to accomplish her personal goals. 44  
 On the view that meaning depends on the worth of your life, seriously 
harming another person in pursuit of a project is unavoidably relevant to 
the worth of the project itself. It can matter not just whether your project 
is successful but what you did to make your project successful. If the 
path to your success is littered with bodies (or maybe just with swindled 
retirees), then your life is less worthwhile. In fact, it may be close to 
worthless. It is also true that the actions we perform necessarily affect an 
accurate conception of our character and identity. Although acting or 
failing to act on categorical desires necessarily affects our character and 
self-concept, our character and the person we are is also reflected in the 
life we lead.  
 
 
4. 
 
I have argued in this paper for a number of limits on the meaning objec-
tion. I have argued that the meaning objection is not plausible unless we 
assume that the person’s ground projects are already limited by morality. 
I have also followed Wolf in making a claim about ground projects: they 
must realize some form of objective value if they are to be defensible 
against considerations that would make an action wrong, in the absence 
of the meaning-conferring reason. I do not think Wolf’s account of 
meaning is strong enough to carry the weight of the meaning objection, 
however, because some projects that satisfy the criteria of being attrac-
tive to a person and objectively valuable are not significant enough or 
central enough in a person’s character to form the basis of a plausible 
reason to live. Instead, I have argued that a person’s reason to live is tied 
to her effort to make her life worthy, and that whether or not her life is 
meaningful can depend on whether she manages to achieve something 
                                                 
 44Scheffler argues that there is no principled defense of agent-centered restrictions, 
e.g., on harming, that constrain agents from actions that directly harm whose purpose is 
to prevent greater harms. One reason people regard constraints as particularly relevant to 
the worth of their lives is that directly harming someone is different in terms of its effects 
on character and how one regards one’s life. Being the cause or agent of harm is some-
thing that one has done whereas failing to prevent someone else from harming is not. 
28 Lisa Rivera 
 
 
 
worthwhile with her life whose value is independent of her desire for it.  
 My argument explains why agents are required to regard their    
meaning-conferring reasons as exceptionally strong reasons. The main 
part of this explanation is not that meaning is part of a person’s good 
(and thus the loss of meaning is costly to her). More importantly, our 
ability to shape our lives, our character and our identity, understood as 
our concept of the kind of person we are, requires us to give meaning-
conferring reasons greater weight than many other reasons we could po-
tentially act upon. To lead the life we have chosen and be the person we 
intend to be, we must give reasons for categorical desires significantly 
greater priority than what are typically considered to be our self-
interested reasons to satisfy other desires and preferences. We may also 
give meaning-conferring reasons greater priority than many aspects of 
our good and sometimes regard them as worth dying for. 
 I doubt that meaning-conferring reasons outweigh all moral require-
ments. That is, the meaning objection may not show that morality is 
never overriding, under any circumstances. One reason it does not show 
this is that many things we do are potentially relevant to whether our 
lives are worthy and acting immorally can sometimes make a person’s 
life unworthy. Another reason the meaning objection does not solve the 
question of overridingness is that we can clearly require a person to at-
tend to moral requirements when doing so does not threaten meaning but 
only makes her projects more difficult to realize. It is more plausible to 
conclude that rather than showing that moral requirements never override 
meaning-conferring reasons, the meaning objection raises a question 
about what we are actually morally required to do.45 
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